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Marsh v. Chambers: The Supreme Court Takes a
New Look at the Establishment Clause
This note will examine the ideas and arguments stated above in
order to provide a greater insight into the Court's interpretation
of the establishment clause of the first amendment.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
"On Sept. 25, 1789. . . final agreement was reached on the lan-
guage of the Bill of Rights,"9 where the first amendment to the
United States Constitution'O is found. It provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof;12 or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of griev-
ances." 1 3 It is well-known throughout American history that the
colonials came to the "New World" in order to escape religious
persecution in England under King George III.14 It was for this
reason that the establishment and free exercise clauses were con-
sidered to be such a necessity in the Bill of Rights.'5
A lengthy, but fairly modern line of Supreme Court decisions
has defined the relationship between government and religion in
terms of the first amendment.' 6 A number of these have been
connected in various ways to education, but that is certainly not
the exclusive situation. The first pivotal case in this line was Ev-
erson v. Board of Education. 17 In Everson, the Court articulated
the need to perform a delicate balancing act between the precepts
of the establishment and free exercise clauses.18 As Justice Black
9. 103 S. Ct. at 3333 (citing J. of the Sen. 88; J. of the H.R. 121).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. This is what has been called the "establishment clause" by the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
12. This provision is known as the "free exercise clause." See, e.g., Committee
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1972); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). As can be seen by comparing this clause with the
establishment clause, a basic tension exists. The first clause limits the practice of
religion as it relates to a formal relationship with the government. Yet seemingly
in direct contrast, the second clause requires government to provide positive op-
portunities for the practice of religious beliefs. It is this tension which added to
the problem faced by the Court in Marsh.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. See generally RUTLAND, BILL OF RIGHTS, 4 COLLIER's ENCYCLOPEDIA 156-61;
VOLWILER, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 22 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 709-17
(1963). See also, Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 8-9.
15. See supra note 14.
16. See infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court upheld a New Jersey statute allowing the par-
ents of parochial school children to be reimbursed for the costs of public transpor-
tation to the schools, even though the majority of the schools were Roman
Catholic.
18. Id. at 14-16; see supra note 12.
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stated in the majority opinion: "[W] e must be careful, in protect-
ing the citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches,
to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from
extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without
regard to their religious belief."19
In Zorach v. Clauson,20 the Court continued the balancing test
begun in Everson2' by indicating that government must steer a
course of neutrality between religious and non-religious activi-
ties. 22 This line of reasoning continued through a number of
other decisions. 23 But in School District v. Schempp, 24 the Court
began to expand its consideration of governmental neutrality by
looking at several factors, namely "the purpose and the primary
effect" of the practice under question, and its "secular legislative
purpose."25 Walz v. Tax Commission of New York 26 brought to
the forefront a third consideration-that of the "degree of entan-
glement" 27 which the practice has with government.
These considerations were integrated into a three-part test in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.28 The Court in Lemon also suggested that
"[in order to determine whether the government entanglement
with religion is excessive, we must examine the character and
19. 330 U.S. at 16.
20. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). The Court determined that allowing public school chil-
dren to be released from classes to attend off-campus religious instruction did not
violate the establishment clause. Cf. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948) (on-campus religious instruction by a private religious group
found to be unconstitutional).
21. 330 U.S. 1.
22. 343 U.S. at 314. 'The government must be neutral when it comes to compe-
tition between sects. It may not thrust any sect on any person. It may not make a
religious observance compulsory." Id.; see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. The first
amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of reli-
gious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adver-
sary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to
favor them." Id.
23. See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
24. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (daily reading of Bible verses or recitation of the Lord's
Prayer by school children violated establishment clause).
25. Id. at 222 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 14-15, and McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442).
26. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Court upheld the practice of allowing tax exemp-
tions to religious organizations for property used exclusively for religious, educa-
tional, or charitable purposes.
27. Id. at 674-75.
28. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The Supreme Court found that paying a subsidy to
parochial school teachers, and reimbursing nonpublic schools for "contract" use of
teachers and study materials was unconstitutional.
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship be-
tween the government and the religious authority."2 9 The Court
in Tilton v. Richardson3 0 emphasized the need to avoid "sponsor-
ship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity," as well as the need to be sensitive to the
precepts of the free exercise clause.3 1
This finely-balanced analysis has remained the same through-
out successive Court decisions involving the establishment
clause.3 2 Justice Brennan did add, in Larson v. Valente,33 that
"when we are presented with a state law granting a denomina-
tional preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as
suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its
constitutionality."3 4
This continuum of precedents provides the backdrop against
which the Marsh35 decision was rendered-the history behind the
establishment and free exercise clauses, the reasoning behind the
theory that government and religion are both best protected by
being separated from each other, and the types of practices con-
sidered to be violations of the first amendment, all of which were
considered in Marsh.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Nebraska Unicameral Legislature begins each of its ses-
sions with a prayer offered by a chaplain who is chosen biennially
by the Executive Board of the Legislative Council. The chaplain
is paid out of general state funds. Reverend Robert E. Palmer, a
Presbyterian minister, has held the position since 1965 at a salary
of $319.75 for each month that the legislature is in session.36
29. Id. at 615.
30. 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S.
at 664). The Court held that providing federal construction grants to sectarian col-
leges was allowable as long as the buildings were used for solely secular purposes.
31. 403 U.S. at 678.
32. See generally Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505 (1982). The
Court found that a Massachusetts law vesting power in churches and schools to
effectively veto applications for those who sought liquor licenses within a 500 foot
radius of church or school premises was a violation of the first amendment. See,
e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
33. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). It was found that exempting religious institutions
which received over fifty percent of their total contributions from members or affil-
iated organizations violated the establishment clause.
34. Id. at 246. By this it appears that the Court would require a greater justifi-
cation, perhaps a legitimate or compelling state interest, in order to allow the pref-
erential and/or discriminatory statute to stand.
35. 103 S. Ct. at 3330.
36. Id. at 3332.
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Guest chaplains are also occasionally heard, either at the request
of a particular legislator, or in Reverend Palmer's absence. At one
point, upon the objections of a Jewish legislator, Reverend Palmer
removed references to Christ from his prayers. It is admitted that
the content of Chaplain Palmer's prayers are, therefore, probably
less sectarian than those of other legislative chaplains.37 The
prayers were recorded in the Legislative Journal and, upon the
vote of the legislature, were occasionally collected and printed
into prayer books at public expense.38
Ernest Chambers, a taxpayer and member of the Nebraska Leg-
islature, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 198339 claiming that the
chaplaincy program violated the establishment clause of the first
amendment. He sought a court order enjoining the practice. 40
The first named defendant in the action was Frank Marsh, the Ne-
braska State Treasurer who paid Chaplain Palmer out of state
funds; Reverend Palmer was also a named defendant.
The district court held that the establishment clause was not vi-
olated by the recitation of prayers; 41 it was violated, however, by
paying the chaplain from state funds.42 The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, applying the three-part Lemon test 43 and the
rule of its earlier decision, Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,44 found that the entire chaplaincy
37, See generally id. at 3336, 3349 n.38. By thus removing references to Jesus
Christ from Chaplain Palmer's prayers, the invocations became less oriented to
the Christian tradition, and thereby more non-sectarian. Other chaplains have not
done so and, as a result, their prayers remain more rooted in traditional
denominationalism.
38. Id. at 3332 n.1. The district court found that this practice violated the es-
tablishment clause. Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 585, 591 (D. Neb. 1980). Peti-
tioners did not bring this issue before the Supreme Court. 103 S. Ct. at 3332 n.3.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
40. 103 S. Ct. at 3332.
41. 504 F. Supp. at 588. "I doubt that allowing prayer for or by its own mem-
bers is 'making a law' [establishing religion] in any sense." Id.
42. Id. at 588, 591.
43. 403 U.S. at 612-13. See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
44. 413 U.S. at 773. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. See also infra
note 95. The test has been articulated in the following way: "First, the statute
program promoted a particular religious expression and led to
government entanglement in religious affairs, thus violating the
establishment clause.45 The defendants sought relief in the
United States Supreme Court, which granted their writ of
certiorari.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
A. Majority Opinion
The Court considered two major issues in Marsh:46 first,
whether opening a legislative session with prayer violates the es-
tablishment clause;47 and second, whether any specific features of
the Nebraska chaplaincy program violate the establishment
clause.48 In considering the first of the two questions before the
Court, Chief Justice Burger opened the majority opinion with a
fairly lengthy historical account which gave credence to the prac-
tice of legislative prayer in both the federal and state govern-
ments. The Chief Justice also mentioned the use of a brief daily
invocation by the federal judicial system. 49 He referred to a volu-
minous amount of historical material50 in order to aid his inter-
pretation of the religion clauses.
Among this body of information, he noted several facts. First,
since Congress authorized the appointment of paid chaplains
three days prior to the approval of the Bill of Rights, 51 it did not
appear likely that Congress felt that a chaplaincy program vio-
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" 403 U.S.
at 612-13 (citations omitted). Further, the Court stated in Lemon that "[i]n order
to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is excessive, we
must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited,
the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship be-
tween the government and the religious authority." Id. at 615.
45. Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 235 (8th Cir. 1982). "We therefore hold
that Nebraska's legislative prayer practice, taken as a whole, is unconstitutional as
a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment." Id.
46. 103 S. Ct. at 3331-32, 3336.
47. Id. at 3331-32.
48. Id. at 3336.
49. Id. at 3332-35. The phrase used daily at the beginning of Court sessions is
"God Save the United States and this Honorable Court." Id. at 3333. See supra
notes 9-15 and accompanying text; see also infra note 140 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., J. of the Continental Cong. (1774-1776, 1784); S. COBB, THE RISE OF
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1970); STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1950); Pfeffer, The Deity in American Constitutional History, 23 J. CHURCH
& STATE 215 (1981). See also 103 S. Ct. at 3332-35 (listing additional sources
therein).
51. 103 S. Ct. at 3333. Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, § 4, 1 Stat. 70, 71, authorized
the congressional chaplains to be paid $500.00 per year. See 103 S. Ct. at 3333 n.7.
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lated the establishment clause.5 2 Second, the practice of choosing
and paying legislative chaplains had continued even in state gov-
ernments, for over a century in many cases, implying that there
was no constitutional problem.5 3 Based on this information, the
Court extrapolated that since the first amendment had been made
applicable to the states through its incorporation by the four-
teenth amendment,5 4 "it would be incongruous to interpret that
clause as imposing more stringent First Amendment limits on the
States than the draftsmen imposed on the Federal
Government." 55
The majority argued that even though there was some opposi-
tion to the idea of legislative prayer both before and after the ini-
tial congressional program began, and later during the 1850's,
such opposition did not weaken the validity of the practice. 56 In-
deed, the Court felt that this disagreement may have instigated a
debate on the policy, resulting in the conclusion that there was no
establishment of religion.57 "Rather, the Founding Fathers looked
at invocations as 'conduct whose ... effect harmonize[d]
with the tenets of some or all religions.' ,58
Chief Justice Burger, adopting the language of Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in McGowan v. Mary-
land,5 9 acknowledged that even though the government regulates
or is involved with conduct which may be religious in nature,
such involvement does not automatically result in an establish-
52. 103 S. Ct. at 3333-35.
53. Id. at 3334.
54. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,
provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .. " It
is through the use of this provision that the Court in Cantwell found that the ten-
ets of the first amendment were also applicable to the individual states. It de-
clared that "[t he Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the
states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws." 310 U.S. at 303.
55. 103 S. Ct. at 3335.
56. Id. at 3334-36. The Court points out that both John Jay and John Rutledge
were in disagreement with the idea of starting the sessions of the First Continen-
tal Congress with prayer. James Madison also suggested that the practice might
violate the principles against the establishment of religion. Likewise, some oppo-
sition was evidenced during the 1850's when the practice was discontinued, but
later renewed. Id. at 3334 n.10, 3335. See also id. at 3343-44 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); infra note 116 and accompanying text.
57. 103 S. Ct. at 3335.
58. Id. (quoting McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442).
59. 366 U.S. at 442.
ment of religion. 60 As Justice Douglas noted in Zorach, if the
state and the church were completely separated from each other,
"[clhurches could not be required to pay even property taxes.
Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire pro-
tection to religious groups."61 Such a result could not, therefore,
have been within the Framers' contemplation.
Finally, the majority noted that the use of a legislative invoca-
tion is merely "a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
among the people of this country."62 This idea was based primar-
ly on Justice Douglas' observation that "[w] e are a religious peo-
ple whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."63
It must be noted that even though the majority acknowledged
that historical precedent alone could not validate a violation of
constitutional rights,64 this historical background was one of the
primary tools which the Court used to reach its decision. To be
fair, however, it also appears that the use of such historical dis-
course did not begin with this case.65 It is certainly true that the
judicious use of historical documents can prove enlightening with
respect to the intent of the writers of the Constitution and how
that intent may be applicable to modern-day situations. At one
point in the opinion, the majority quoted Samuel Adams as say-
ing that "he was no bigot, and could hear a prayer from a gen-
tleman of piety and virtue, who was at the same time a friend to
his country."66 It is likely that such a sentiment could be ex-
pressed today as easily as it was some 200 years ago. Addition-
ally, some contemplation should be given to the fact that the
content of prayers can be kept to a fairly non-sectarian level,67 al-
lowing each person to interpret the thoughts expressed as he
chooses and, thereby, minimize offense. 68
The primary argument against the Marsh opinion is the fact
that the majority did not use the three-part test used in Lemon 69
60. 103 S. Ct. at 3335.
61. 343 U.S. at 312.
62. 103 S. Ct. at 3336.
63. Id. (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 313).
64. 103 S. Ct. at 3334. Certainly the abolition of slavery and the later advance-
ment of civil rights for black Americans is an example of how a viewpoint held at
the time of the Framers was invalidated, despite its long practice.
65. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 425-35; McGowan, 366 U.S. at 440-42; Everson, 330
U.S. at 8-11; see generally Walz, 397 U.S. 665-68. Each decision gives a fairly de-
tailed historical background of the situation and circumstances surrounding the
first amendment.
66. 103 S. Ct. at 3335 (quoting C. ADAMs, FAMiLLAR LETTERS OF JOHN ADAMS
AND His WIFE, ABIGAIL ADAMs, DURING THE REVOLUTION 37-38).
67. See supra note 37.
68. Contra 103 S. Ct. at 3349-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. 403 U.S. at 612, 615.
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or Nyquist, 70 both establishment clause cases. 7 1 A different result
might have been reached had this test been used. However, it is
equally arguable that the same result could, in fact, have been
reached.72
The second issue discussed by the Court concerned the validity
of the specific features of the Nebraska legislative chaplaincy pro-
gram. The court considered various facets of that scheme, includ-
ing: (1) the selection of the same chaplain since 1965; (2) the
payment of the chaplain from public funds; and (3) the allegedly
traditional, Judeo-Christian content of the prayers.
Addressing the first of these points, the Court concluded that
rather than showing preference for one religious sect the choice
of one chaplain over a long period of time was proof that Rever-
end Palmer's style was amenable to the forum in which he was
working.7 3 From this conclusion, the majority articulated the "im-
permissible motive" analysis: that is, absent proof of an imper-
missible motive on the part of those selecting the chaplain, the
mere fact that one person holds the position for some time will
not be found to conflict with the establishment clause.74
The Court then returned to its historical rationale in consider-
ing the legislature's payment of the chaplain from public funds. It
found that the practice of paying chaplains "is grounded in his-
toric[all practice," not only with respect to Congress, but also
with respect to state legislatures. 75
In addressing the third point, the majority decided that the con-
tent of prayers need not be analyzed where, as in Marsh, the time
was not being used for proselytizing, or the advancement or deni-
gration of any particular religious denomination. 76
Finally, the Court denied the validity of the concern that the
practice of legislative prayer "risks the beginning of . . . estab-
70. 413 U.S. at 772-73.
71. 103 S. Ct. at 3338 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 28, 43-44 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 93-107.
72. See infra notes 78-96 and accompanying text, where Justice Brennan's ar-
gument that the Court could not have reached its present result had the tradi-
tional test been used is discussed. 103 S. Ct. at 3338-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. 103 S. Ct. at 3336.
74. Id. Therefore, rather than really reaching the issue of Chaplain Palmer's
length of tenure, except to compare it to that of other chaplains in the Congress
(Id. at 3336 & n.17), the Court appeared to skirt the problem by noting that no evi-
dence of an impermissible motive existed.
75. Id. at 3336-37. See also supra note 51 (Congress pays its chaplains).
76. 103 S. Ct. at 3337.
lishment" by relying on the distinction "between real threat and
mere shadow,"77 concluding that the latter was applicable in this
situation.
The Court's application of an "impermissible motive" analysis
to the determination of whether the legislature's employment of a
Presbyterian minister for sixteen consecutive years violated the
establishment clause, is an indication that one would need to es-
tablish an obvious trend of favoritism toward one type of religion
or clergyman. In addition, some evidence indicating the reasons
behind the selecting committee's choice of a particular chaplain
would be needed in order to prevail in an establishment clause
case.7 8 This could be difficult to prove. Legislative bodies may
then be permitted a greater degree of freedom in choosing their
chaplains.7 9
Using this mode of analysis as a background, the majority
stated that when none of the above can be proven, the courts will
not have to reach the issue of the content of the prayer.80 This
reasoning is a bit circular because if the Court finds evidence of
an impermissible motive in selecting the chaplain, it still would
not need "to parse the content of a particular prayer."8 1 The prac-
tice would be stricken down on the first ground in every case.
The most persuasive and sensible argument made by the major-
ity was that given the long-standing tradition of legislative prayer,
if the practice has not yet resulted in the establishment of reli-
gion, it is unlikely that it poses any threat to ever do so. 8 2 It
would not seem to be an event of great religious significance.
While Justice Brennan argued that "the Court seems to regard
legislative prayer as at most a de minimus violation" 83 based on
its use of the "real threat and mere shadow"84 comparison, the
Court appeared to say that there was no violation, rather than a
minor violation. As Justice Clark stated in Schempp:
77. Id. (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)).
78. Another example of the use of a type of "impermissible motive" test, albeit
in the context of alleged racial discrimination, can be seen in the case of Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
79. That is, if no discernible discriminatory method of choosing legislative
chaplains can be found, the Court seems to be saying that it will give deference to
the legislatures by respecting their choices, in the absence of other constitutional
violations.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 3337 ("rhe content of the prayer is not of concern to judges
where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been ex-
ploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other faith or be-
lief.") Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 3349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 3337 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
[Vol. 11: 591, 1984] Marsh v. Chambers
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
[I]t is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be rela-
tively minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach of neu-
trality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging
torrent and, in the words of Madison, "it is proper to take alarm at the first
experiment on our liberties. ' 8 5
It seems fair to assume that if the Court had found a violation,
it would have had no more problem prohibiting the practice of
legislative prayer than it had prohibiting school prayer, or the
other practices found to violate the establishment clause in previ-
ous cases. 86 In a similar vein, Justice Stevens pointed out in his
dissent that the legislative prayer could have a tendency to be
quite sectarian;87 however, since it continued without widespread
objection there seemed to be no real problem with this practice. 88
B. Justice Brennan's Dissent
Justice Brennan began his dissenting opinion 89 by noting that
the majority carefully limited its decision in a manner justified by
dicta in earlier cases, thus offering "little threat to the overall fate
of the Establishment Clause."90 He admitted that he previously
expressed a similar position in his concurring opinion in
Schempp.91 Recanting his earlier beliefs, he now realized that
this position of tolerance for legislative prayer was misguided. 92
Justice Brennan first took issue with the Court's refusal to ap-
ply the three-part test articulated in Lemon. 93 He believed that it
would have dictated a contrary result.94 The test is: (1) "the stat-
ute must have a secular legislative purpose;" (2) "its principle or
85. 374 U.S. at 225 (quoting Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments, II WRITrIGS OF MADISON 184 (1910)).
86. See, e.g., 374 U.S. at 203.
87. 103 S. Ct. at 3352 & n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens chose, as
an example, a prayer used by Reverend Palmer two years prior to the time he re-
moved references to Christ from his prayers at the request of a legislator. See also
id. at 3336 n.14.
88. The dissent did note that sporadic objections have been made to the ap-
pearance of individual clergymen at particular legislatures. Id. at 3340 n.10 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). One example chosen-that of a particular Indian guru's
follower in Oregon-may be somewhat unillustrative, as that person is controver-
sial for political reasons as well. See Shortcut to Nirvana, Life Mag., Nov. 1981 at
73-80. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
89. 103 S. Ct. at 3337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. 374 U.S. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. 103 S. Ct. at 3337-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. 403 U.S. at 612-13. See supra notes 28, 43-44, 71-72 and accompanying text.
94. 103 S. Ct. at 3338-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion;" and (3) "the statute must not foster 'an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.'"95
Justice Brennan argued first that a legislative session could be
opened in a different way, maintaining the same formal tone, but
without the "preeminently religious" purpose of legislative
prayer.96 Thus, he felt that the first prong of the test was clearly
not met. It is arguable, however, that the mere fact that other
methods exist, does not necessarily implicate the method used.
Further, while invoking divine guidance is arguably a religious
act, if the act does not promote a particular denomination, but
merely recognizes the widespread national belief in religion, it
may not be a violation of the establishment clause.97 Rather, it
may merely represent an accomodation of religion possibly man-
dated by the free exercise clause.
Secondly, Justice Brennan found that "[t]he 'primary effect' of
legislative prayer is also [a] clearly religious" one which may op-
erate coercively upon those present who may not wish to partici-
pate, and which may confer prestige on religion by its
involvement with government. 98 Admittedly, to the extent it may
be said that the mere presence of prayer "advances" religion, this
is a weak point in the majority opinion.99 However, it is also pos-
sible that Justice Brennan's fear of coercion of the legislators who
hear the prayer may be a bit unfounded. Disregarding the fact
that many legislators may not even be present, it seems that
those who do attend are more likely to view the invocation in the
light of a formality rather than an attempt by the chaplain to con-
vert them. 100
In addition, it does not appear to be necessary to completely
abolish the practice of legislative prayer in order to maintain the
mandated neutral course between religion and non-religion.10 l
Even if Nebraska's present course is found to be unacceptable,
the alternatives of rotating chaplains of various denominations
95. Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
96. 103 S. Ct. at 3338 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This theme can also be seen in
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Schempp, 374 U.S. at 265, where he states
that "government may not employ religious means to serve secular interests, how-
ever legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstration that non-
religious means will not suffice." If the practice of legislative prayer can be seen
as an opportunity for the free exercise of religion, certainly no other means would
suffice. See infra note 128.
97. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
98. 103 S. Ct. at 3338-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Engel, 370 U.S. at 431).
99. 103 S. Ct. at 3335-36.
100. See id. at 3336.
101. Zorac, 343 U.S. at 314, sets out this requirement. See also Everson, 330
U.S. at 18 (earlier expression of the same).
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and paying them a per diem fee, rather than a monthly salary, or
instituting a moment of quiet resolution led by such a chaplain,
could provide a workable solution without resorting to a complete
abolition. 0 2 But, in this case, the fact that guest chaplains were
heard at the request of legislators, or in Reverend Palmer's ab-
sence, tends to show that no single religious view was impermissi-
bly favored.
Third, Justice Brennan concluded that the legislative chap-
laincy program resulted in excessive government entanglement
with religion because of the legislature's supervision of the choice
of the chaplain and its assurance that "suitable" prayers would be
used, as well as by its division of the legislature "on issues of reli-
gion and religious conformity."' 0 3 However, he admitted that hav-
ing one chaplain since 1965 might minimize the effects of the
former.l0 4
While to a certain extent it is true that by selecting chaplains
the government does become "involved" with "supervising" reli-
gion, it does not seem likely that this was the kind of involvement
feared by the Framers. They were probably more concerned that
government not become involved in religious instruction, manage-
ment, persecution, or the like, rather than the mere acknowledg-
ment of the presence and importance of religion in its various
forms. 05 Likewise, the actual "supervision" involved in a legisla-
tive chaplaincy program is probably minimal: an initial admonish-
ment and a periodic administrative review.106
As for Justice Brennan's second objection, he seemed to bypass
the fact that Reverend Palmer removed references to Christ from
his prayers upon request, thus negating further sectarian prefer-
ence. Further, while division based upon religious lines is not un-
102. Cf. 103 S. Ct. at 3349 n.39 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing N.Y. Times, Sept.
4, 1982, at 8) (statement of Jerry FalweU).
103. 103 S. Ct. at 3339-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-
22).
104. 103 S. Ct. at 3344 n.21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the significance of
the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and worship God and
that many of our legal, political and personal values derive historically
from religious teachings. Government must inevitably take cognizance of
the existence of religion and, indeed, under certain circumstances the
First Amendment may require that it do so.
Id.
106. Contra 103 S. Ct. at 3339 n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
known even in the modern world,107 it must be noted that there
are also general, underlying political rifts in such situations.
Thus, while the potential for such divisiveness exists in today's
America, the practice of legislative prayer does not promote such
schisms'0 8 and need not be abolished. The state's provision of a
forum to a church indicates a mere openness to ideas rather than
direct aid and encouragement.
Justice Brennan's next point was that "[t] he principles of 'sepa-
ration' and 'neutrality' implicit in the Establishment Clause serve
many purposes," four of which are applicable in this case. 0 9 "The
first... is to guarantee the individual right to conscience" which
Justice Brennan felt was contravened when individuals are re-
quired "to support the practices of a faith with which they do not
agree." 110 However, the mere fact that legislators may listen to an
invocation does not indicate that they are being coerced into sup-
port of such belief.11
"The second purpose ... is to keep the state from interfering in
the essential autonomy of religious life, either by taking upon it-
self the decision of religious issues, or by unduly involving itself
in the supervision of religious institutions or officials."112 While
Justice Brennan did not elaborate on this point, there appeared to
be little if any interference of this kind in Marsh. 113
"The third purpose ... is to prevent the trivialization and deg-
radation of religion by too close an attachment to the organs of
government."1 4 Again Justice Brennan did not make a direct ap-
plication of this principle, contradicting his earlier point that by
associating with government, religion may receive impermissible
prestige.115 This points up the difficulty of resolving a question
such as this, fraught as it is with the problems of preferring
neither sectarianism nor secularism.116 "Finally, the principles of
separation and neutrality help assure that essentially religious is-
sues, precisely because of their importance and sensitivity, not
become the occasion for battle in the political arena." 117
107. This is evidenced by the ongoing tension between Catholics and Protes-
tants in Northern Ireland.
108. Contra 103 S. Ct. at 3339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. See generally 103 S. Ct. at 3341-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 3341 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. 103 S. Ct. at 3335 (citing Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686; Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver
Gen'l, 392 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (Mass. 1979)).
112. 103 S. Ct. at 3342 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
113. See supra notes 59-72.
114. 103 S. Ct. at 3342 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 3339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also acknowledged
this apparent contradiction. Id. at 3339 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
117. 103 S. Ct. at 3342 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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While this appears to be the primary motivation of the Framers
in creating the establishment clause, the practice of legislative
prayer does not really establish a national religion; it only gives
credence to the pervasiveness of religion in American society. 118
Thus, it does not fall within the purview of the establishment
clause.
Justice Brennan's concern for the potential isolation or aliena-
tion of citizens from the nation due to government action upon an
"authorized" religion is a valid one. Yet such an occurrence ap-
pears equally unlikely, even to nonbelievers. Indeed, one might
argue that if the government continues to show sensitivity toward
the subject of religion, the fears of some that the country could
abolish religion entirely or persecute believers might be allayed.
The complete abolition of such a connection between church and
state does not appear to be necessary in order to bring about
neutrality.
Justice Brennan also resorted to the use of history to discredit
the policy of legislative prayer.119 He noted that at one point,
James Madison felt that the practice of paying legislative chap-
lains was unconstitutional as it was akin to instituting a pre-
scribed act of worship upon the people through their
representatives and requiring them to pay for it.120
As the majority pointed out, however, the expression of opposi-
tion to an idea does not necessarily make the idea wrong,121 al-
though neither does overcoming the objection necessarily make
the idea right. It is equally possible that once the disagreement
was discussed, the objection was found not to be a problem. Jus-
tice Brennan, himself, stated in Walz 122 that it appears that
Madison may have only come to this "extreme" view of church-
state relations late in life, as neither he nor many other Fram-
ers 23 expressed such a concern at the time of the drafting. These
men would not let such a violation go unnoticed.
Justice Brennan expressed the opinion that while the tension
between the establishment and free exercise clauses creates the
118. See supra text accompanying notes 58, 62-63.
119. 103 S. Ct. at 3342-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 3343-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Fleet, Madison's "Detached
Memoranda", 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 558 (1946)).
121. 103 S. Ct. at 3335. See supra note 56.
122. 397 U.S. at 684-85 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring).
123. See supra note 56.
need to "deviate from an absolute adherence to separation and
neutrality" in certain limited, specified situtations, this was not
such a circumstance. 124
It is arguable, however, that there are situations where religious
institutions are singled out for certain benefits where other pri-
vate secular bodies are not. 125 Since this is allowed, it seems no
more intrusive to allow a chaplain to speak in front of the legisla-
ture for a moment, than it is to permit the expression of secular
points of view, including those against religion.
Justice Brennan argued that while religious and secular con-
cerns overlap permissibly in many instances, the sheer religious-
ness of prayer makes this instance impermissible. 12 6
Unfortunately, Justice Brennan offered no further justification for
this position, giving it no more weight than an apparently emo-
tional conclusion. As previously noted, the practice of legislative
prayer is arguably a mere recognition of the importance of reli-
gious beliefs in this nation, rather than an attempt at an
establishment.127
Justice Brennan was able to refute this argument even though
he recognized the value of religion in the cultural and historical
background of this country. 28 He believed that prayer is purely
religious in nature. Supporters of legislative prayer would only
achieve a Pyrrhic victory by denying that fact inasmuch as they
would have to strip the prayer of any religious value.129 This cer-
tainly could be true. But it seems that Justice Brennan dis-
counted the fact that Chaplain Palmer willingly omitted
references to Christ from his prayers; he did not make one reli-
gion preeminent. He therefore allowed the recognition of a vari-
ety of beliefs: "recognition" being permissible in Brennan's own
words.130
Justice Brennan argued that the purposes of the establishment
clause could best be achieved by abolishing legislative prayer be-
cause it would eliminate tension between church and state.131
124. 103 S. Ct. at 3344-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. 664, where tax-exempt status was given to property
where worship services were held.
126. 103 S. Ct. at 3345 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 62, 105 and accompanying text.
129. 103 S. Ct. at 3345 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. "Government cannot ... be forbidden to recognize the religious beliefs
and practices of the American people as an aspect of our history and culture." Id.
(footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 3346 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A similar thought can be found in Ev-
erson, 330 U.S. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting): "Complete separation between the
state and religion is best for the state and best for religion." Id. See also Zorach,
343 U.S. at 319 (Black, J., dissenting).
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However, an unavoidable tension exists between the precepts of
the establishment clause and those of the free exercise clause. 3 2
A careful balance must be struck between the two or it is possible
that a hostile attitude against religion could result, unwarranted
by the mandates of the establishment clause.133
Justice Brennan further stated, however, that invocation of the
free exercise clause was inappropriate because legislative prayer
was not being used for the purpose of giving legislators the oppor-
tunity to worship. It was merely being used to open the legisla-
tive sessions.13
While it is true that the latter was the primary stated purpose
for the legislative prayer, it cannot be gainsaid that the former is
also the case. One cannot discount the effect of daily calling one's
attention to the possibility that there is a Creator higher than
one's self. It is an acknowledgment that the guidance and wisdom
in the business at hand would be invaluable, especially as an aid
to the "high purpose" 35 of the legislator's calling. Others could
use that time to pray to their god.136
Claiming that the Court allowed its purely historical analysis to
override other concerns, Justice Brennan made three arguments.
First, the majority could have mistaken the Framers' intent in im-
plementing the congressional chaplaincy program, as there may
not have been as much consideration of the policy as the majority
thought. Secondly, he pointed out that the Court looked only to
the intent of Congress in drafting the first amendment and not to
the intent of the states which ratified it. Finally, he argued that
the majority treated the Constitution as a static rather than flex-
ible document which would be able to deal with modern
situations. 37
While it is true that the majority could have made an incorrect
assumption with regard to the Framers' intent, it is equally true
132. See supra note 12; see also Schempp, 374 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing). "[T] he fact is that while in many contexts the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause fully complement each other, there are areas in which a doc-
trinaire reading of the Establishment Clause leads to irreconcilable conflict with
the Free Exercise Clause." Id.
133. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 443 (Douglas, J., concurring); Everson, 330 U.S.
at 18.
134. 103 S. Ct. at 3346 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also supra note 96.
135. Id. at 3338 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 3339.
137. Id. at 3347-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
that its informed and oft-exercised judgment may have reached
the correct result. As noted earlier, the practice of legislative
prayer in Congress was stopped for a period of time during the
1850's.138 It therefore seems likely that even if the First Congress
did not give the issue the time or consideration it deserved, Con-
gress had an ample second opportunity to reconsider the practice.
As the practice was reinstated, it appears to be a reasonable as-
sumption that no difficulties were perceived. 3 9 In addition, if at
any time after the Bill of Rights was ratified Congress felt that the
legislative chaplaincy system was unconstitutional, it could have
discontinued the program. In the absence of any such considera-
tion, the legislation enjoys a presumption of constitutionality.
Further, even though ideals and mores can change, that does
not mean that they have changed. While it is true that there are
more religious denominations and viewpoints in America today
than there were at the time of the Framers, religion as a whole is
still abounding in modern American society; even so, it is not
found to be pervasively offensive. Therefore, this rationale for
eliminating legislative prayer was unwarranted.
Next, Justice Brennan contended with the majority's argument
that the practice of legislative prayer can be equated to such "in-
nocuous" expressions as "In God We Trust," "God Save the
United States and the Honorable Court," and "One Nation Under
God," which are no longer filled with religious connotations. He
disagreed with this contention on three grounds:' 40 (1) legislative
prayers tend to be more actively sectarian than mottos, thus the
former should be abolished;141 (2) even though the practice might
look non-sectarian to nine justices, prayer is serious theological
business to the devout and not merely an acknowledgment of be-
lief;142 and (3) there would be too many problems involved in the
practice of legislative prayer if everyone's beliefs were truly con-
sidered, and it is beyond the government's competence to act as
an ecclesiastical arbiter.14 3
The third basis is Justice Brennan's most persuasive argument.
The detailed list of variances in religious beliefs which he gave is
certainly mind-boggling.'" Yet even in light of these enormous
138. Id. at 3334 n.10. Cf. Id. at 3340 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra
note 56 and accompanying text.
139. Id. at 3334 n.10.
140. Id. at 3349-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text.
141. 103 S. Ct. at 3349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 3349-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. For example, some faiths would object to interfaith group prayer, while
others would find the attempt at nondenominational prayer distasteful. Likewise,
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difficulties, it does not necessarily follow that legislative prayer
must be abolished in order to rectify the problem. If one could
equate this situation to other thorny problems which the Court
has confronted-such as the abortion issue-it seems no more nor
less emotionally charged. Both issues go to the root of one's be-
liefs, yet the Court did not decline to be the arbiter there, nor did
it indicate that the practice must be completely abolished so that
the issue would not have to be faced by the Court. In reality, the
majority was merely making a comparison to show that even the
proceedings of the judiciary are imbued with some religious ele-
ments. It certainly did not appear to be a major point.145
The final point which Justice Brennan raised was that complete
separation of church and state may actually promote a greater de-
gree of religious freedom. Therefore, while abolition of legislative
prayer might raise a furor, it should ultimately result in more
freedom for all.'4 6
Such a conclusion, of course, is only speculation. However, it
seems that a distinction can be made between freedom to allow
religion's existence and freedom from religion. It is the former
that is embodied in the first amendment, taking both the estab-
lishment and the free exercise clauses into account. It is this type
of practice which allows the appearance of neutrality for, without
it, the "religion" of secularism may be preferred. 47
C. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens raised two major points in his dissenting opin-
ion.146 The first of these was that "[r] egardless of the motivation"
of the legislators who appoint the legislative chaplain, the re-ap-
pointment of one clergyman for over sixteen years shows an im-
plicit "preference of one faith over another in violation of the
Establishment Clause." 49 While this argument is persuasive, the
better view seems to be that sectarian views could only be imper-
missibly favored if the chaplain utilized them. Absent such a
showing, the issue is not ripe for adjudication.
some might object to petitionary prayer, while others would feel that any prayer
made must be petitionary. Id. at 3349-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. The majority gave the point only short shrift. Id. at 3333.
146. Id. at 3351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
148. 103 S. Ct. at 3351-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
Secondly, Justice Stevens stated that despite the statements of
the majority, the opinion did not evaluate the content of Reverend
Palmer's prayers because their sectarianism could not have been
explained away.150 This argument is pertinent because it attacks
a weak portion of the majority opinion.15 ' However, it seems to
ignore the fact that Reverend Palmer changed the content of his
invocations at the request of a Jewish legislator in order to re-
move elements of sectarianism, thus pointing up the fact that
such prayers can be neutral in content.152
V. IMPACT
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the
Court narrowed its holding to such a specific point that it may
have carved out a new exception to existing law.153 This is sup-
ported by the fact that the traditional Lemon test154 has been
used for a fairly long period of time. Until very recently, there has
been no sign that the Court found the test inadequate. However,
due to the strong majority opinion in Marsh, this exception might
be seen as significant. 55
One additional noteworthy aspect of this decision is the grow-
ing trend toward consideration of religious matters by various
members of the government, notably President Reagan. The deci-
150. Id. at 3352 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 86 and accompanying
text.
151. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 37, 67 and accompanying text. As a sidelight, it is interest-
ing to note that Justice Stevens states, "I would not expect to find a Jehovah's Wit-
ness or a disciple of Mary Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon serving as the
official chaplain in any state legislature." 103 S. Ct. at 3351 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
153. 103 S. Ct. at 3337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. 403 U.S. at 612-13. See supra notes 29, 43-44, 69-71 and accompanying text.
155. Additional evidence that the Court may be moving away from the tradi-
tional establishment clause test came in Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317 (U.S.
Mar. 6, 1984) (No. 82-1256). It was held there that the town of Pawtucket, Rhode
Island could display a creche on private property to commemorate the observance
of the Christmas holiday.
The five to four majority opinion in the case was written by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, and was joined by Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justice
O'Connor also submitted a separate concurring opinion, advertising a cautious
scrutiny of all religion clause issues.
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan, and joined by Justices Mar-
shall, Stevens, and Blackmun, criticized the majority for relaxing constitutional
standards with regard to the establishment clause. Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justice Stevens, filed a separate dissent which also stated that the majority down-
played the significance of the display.
Dean Jesse Choper, however, has speculated that even this decision would not
necessarily pave the way for more liberal treatment of establishment clause is-
sues. See generally Low, Cities May Display Nativity Scenes, High Court Says-
'Religious' Test Eased, L.A. Daily J., March 6, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
[Vol. 11: 591, 1984] Marsh v. Chambers
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
sion may create a deceptively hospitable environment for the re-
instatement of voluntary school prayer. There may also have
arisen the hope that the Court would reconsider its stance on the
issue. It appears, however, at least for the present, that the status
quo will continue with respect to cases involving the establish-
ment clause.
DIANE L. WALKER

